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by Janine P Geske & William C. Gleisner III
n March 31,2005, in Supreme Court Order (SCO) 03-06, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court repealed the frivolous action rules contained in Wis. Stat. sections 802.05 and
814.025, effective July 1, 2005, and replaced them with new Rule 802.05. 1 This
article briefly discusses the history of the frivolous action law in Wisconsin and the
dissenting justices' objections to the new UXle.2 The article also discusses several
important considerations relative to seeking and resisting sanctions enforcement
actions under new Rule 802.05, including: 1) whether the frivolous action rule
should be applied retroactively to actions already pending as of July 1, 2005; and
2) what sanctions can and should be imposed for violating the rule.
The History of Frivolous Action Law in Wisconsin

The frivolous action rules in former Wis. Stat. sections 802.05 and 814.025 were
adopted in 1978. Under former section 802.05, a trial court had discretion to impose a sanction on finding that a party had filed a petition, motion, or other paper
in bad faith, but that section provided little guidance as to the nature or extent of
any possible sanction. Under former section 814.025, once a court made a finding
of frivolousness under that section, the section required the court to award the
party that moved for such a finding its costs and reasonable attorney fees. As a consequence, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in Jandrt v. Jerome Foods
Inc. 3 that it had to uphold an award of $716,081 in costs and attorney fees against a
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Milwaukee law firm pursuant to section
814.025. In evaluating the reasonableness of an award of alleged costs and
attorney fees, the Jandrt court further
instructed trial courts that awards under
section 814.025 could "fully compensate" an aggrieved party for its alleged
harm because of a finding of frivolousness under the section. As the supreme
comt stated in Jandrt:
"Because the circuit court properly
found that the Previant firm frivolously
continued the underlying action, and we
affiUP, sanctions in this case are mandatory. See Wis. Stat. § 814.025(1) ... The
Previant finn DUJXHVthat while the sanction is mandatory, the amount awarded
is not reasonable and is contrary to the
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 which
it believes is to deter litigants and attorneys from commencing or continuing
frivolous actions and to punish those
who do so. While we agree with the
Previant firm that deterrence and punishment are the underlying purposes
of§ 814.025, ... we are less convinced
that compensation is not an appropriate consideration. Certainly, deterrence
and punishment of an attorney or party
who maintains a frivolous action is not
inconsistent with fully compensating an
opposing party for the costs and attorneys fees required to defend a frivolous
action."~

The Jandrt decision and the comt's
interpretation of former sections 802.05
and 814.025 generated controversy
and calls for reform, which eventually
led to the filing of petitions to and the
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11, AS AMENDEDIN 1993.

holding of bearings before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The criticisms
centered on the fact that Wisconsin's
frivolous action rules had not changed
since their adoption in the mid 1970s
although Rule 11 ofthe Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP 11), on which
the Wisconsin rules were modeled, had
undergone changes, the most significant
of which occurred in 1993.
The Wisconsin Judicial Council first
sought reform in a petition filed in October 2000, asking that the supreme court
consider several proposed changes to
the frivolous action rules, including the
introduction of a 14-day "safe harbor"
provision. Under that provision, no action or sanction could be imposed on a
party charged \vith the frivolous fiJing of
a coXUt document, if the party withdrew
the filing within 14 days of service of a
motion on the party so charged.
While the Judicial Council did not
call for adopting FRCP 11, as amended
in 1993, a 2001 filing of the Wisconsin
Academy of Trial LaZ\ers LQ support of
the Judicial Council's petition did call
for its adoption. Following a ovember
2001 hearing on the Judicial Council's
petition, the supreme coUJt in SCO 9907 denied the Judicial Council's petition
on Jan. 29, 2002.
On July 8, 2003, joint petition 03-06
was filed \vith the supreme court seeking
repeal of sections 802.05 and 814.025
and asking the court to adopt FRCP
11, as amended in 1993, by means of
enacting amended Rule 802.05. This
petition had wide support from both
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the plaintiffs' bar and the defense bar,
as evidenced by coauthorship of the
petition by the Wisconsin chapter of the
American Board of Trial Advocates, the
Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin, the
State Bar Litigation Section, and the
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.
The petition asserted that when first
adopted, sections 802.05 and 814.025
were patterned after the OJiginal FRCP
11, and that fi·om time to time Wisconsin appellate courts have looked to
federal court decisions in interpreting
and applying these statutes. The joint
petition noted that in Jandrt, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did in fact look
to federal decisions interpreting FRCP
11 (albeit decisions interpreting FRCP
11 before its amendment in 1993). The
joint petition also noted that there had
been no substantive changes in the Wisconsin rules governing ftivolous filings
since they were adopted in 1978, but
that FRCP 11 had undergone substantial revision, most notably in 1993. As
stated in the Federal Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 11, the 1993
amendments "were intended to remedy
problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983
revisions of the rule."
Joint petition 03-06 further argued
that there were no unique aspects of
Wisconsin practice that would justiIY
departing from the approach taken by
the federal courts under FRCP 11, as
amended in 1993. The petition also
argued that by adopting FRCP 11, as
amended in 1993, Wisconsin attorneys
and courts would be able to look to
applicable decisions of federal courts
since 1993 for guidance in interpreting
and applying the mandates of FRCP 11
in Wisconsin.
Joint petition 03-06 recommended
adopting the 1993 Federal Advisory
Committee Notes to FHCP 11 to guide
the bench and bar in arriving at reasonable interpretations of a Wisconsin version ofF5CP 11. Those notes specified
in part that ">FRCP 11, as amended in
1993] does not attempt to enumerate
the factors a court should consider in
deciding whether to impose a sanction
or what sanctions would be appropriate
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in the circumstances; but, for emphasis,
it does specifically note that a sanction
may be nonmonetary as well as monetary. :hether the improper conduct
was willful, or negligent; whether it
was part of a pattern of activity, or an
isolated event; whether it infected the
entire pleading, or only one particular
count or defense; whether the person
has engaged in similar conduct in other
litigation; whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation
process in time or expense; whether
the responsible person is trained in the
law; what amount, given the financial
resources of the responsible person, is
needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is
needed to deter similar activity by other
litigants: all of these may in a particular
case be proper considerations."
Supreme Court Order 03·06

On Dec. 19, 2003, the supreme court
held a public hearing on joint petition 03-06 and, at a subsequent public
adminiVWUative conference, tentatively
voted to approve the petition. The petition was again the subject of a supreme
court public adminisb·ative conference
on ov. 16, 2004. On Ylarch 31, 2005,
Lhe court filed SCO 03-06.5 [tis very
important to note that the supreme
court adopted SCO 03-06 on a 4-3 vote.
Supreme Court Order 03-06 repeals
Wis. Stat. sections 802.05 and 814.025,
HIfective July 1, 2005, and adopts in
their place a Wisconsin version of
)RCP ll, as amended in 1993.
Supreme Cowt Order 03-06
consists of a main order entered by
four justices and strenuous dissents by
three justices. The dissents to the order
are considered below, but first it is
LPSRUWDQWthat all practitioners understand how SCO 03-06 will affect their
practices. A discussion of the substance
of new Rule 802.05 follows.
The Safe Harbor

1HZRule 802.05 provides a "safe
harbor" of21 days for litigants, within
which time counsel accused of ftivolous

conduct can escape sanctions if he or
she withdraws an offending document.
In other words, a party who wishes to
seek sanctions may immediately serve
a motion for sanctions on an offending
party. However, that motion cannot be
filed or presented to the court for 21
days afte'r service. Any party who seeks
to file the motion or othervvise present
the motion to the court before the expiration of 21 days (such as by seeking
a hearing date during that time) risks
being found in ddirect violation of Rule
802.05(3){a).
Judicial Discretion in Awarding
Sanctions for Frivolous ConduFW

Gone from new Rule 802.05 is the
suggestion that an aggrieved party can
automatically use frivolous action rules
to secure full compensation for the
achtal costs and attorney fees incurred
due to allegedly frivolous conduct. New
Rule 802.05 provides circuit courts
with wide discretion in determining
that an act is frivolous and ample guidance and suggestions as to how circuit
courts can narrowly tailor sanctions to
correct specific misconduct. New Rule
802.05(3)(b) provides in part that: "[a]
sanction imposed for violation of this
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient
to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.... The sanction may consist
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty
into court, or, if imposed on motion and
warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant
of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses ... ."
The flexibility in determining the
scope of possible remedial responses is
reinforced by the SCO 03-06 majority's
comments to new Rule 802.05: "Factors that the court may consider in
imposing sanctions include the following: (1) Whether the alleged frivolous
conduct was part of a pattern of activity
or an isolated event; (2) Whether the
conduct infected the entire pleading
or was an isolated claim or defense;
and (3) Whether the attorney or party

has engaged in similar conduct in other
litigation. Sanctions authorized under s.
802.05{3) may include an award of actual
fees and costs to the party victimized by
the frivolous conduct."
Judicial flexibility in responding
to allegedly frivolous conduct is also
emphatically underscored in the 1993
Federal Notes that are set IRUWK in SCO
03-06:
"The court has available a variety of
possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand,
or censure; requiring participation in
seminars or other educational programs;
ordering a fine payable to the comt;
referring the matter to disciplinary
authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, to the Attorney General,
Inspector General, or agency head), etc.
. .. The rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should consider in
deciding whether to impose a sanction
or what sanctions would be appropriate
in the circumstances; but, for emphasis,
it does specifically note that a sanction
may be nonmonetary as well as monetary. Whether the improper conduct
was willful, or negligent; whether it
was part of a pattern of activity, or an
isolated event; whether it infected the
entire pleading, or only one particular
count or defense; whether the person
has engaged in similar conduct in other
litigation; whether it was intended to
injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; whether
the responsible person is trained in the
law; what amount, given the financial
resources of the responsible person, is
needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is
needed to deter similar activity by other
litigants: all of these may in a particular
case be proper considerations."
Limited Permission to Make Factual
Contentions that Lack Evidentiary
Support
ewRule 802.05 specifically allows
parties and their counsel ample opportunity to conduct discovery to shore up
(continued on SDJH50)
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allegations and defenses in complaints,
answers, and counterclaims. Rule
802.0,5(2) specifies:
"(c) The allegations and other IDFWX
al contentions stated in the paper have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery.
"(d) The denials of factual contentions stated in the paper are warranted
on the evidence or, ifspecifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a
lack of infonnation or belief."
It appears clear that plaintiffs'
counsel in particular \vill Zant to be
very careful to denote with specificity
the paragraphs in a complaint that "are
likely to have evidentimy support after
a reasonable opportunity for fXUther
investigation or discovery.'' Defense
counsel will want to be equally as
careful to denote with specificity those
paragraphs in an answer that are "reasonably'' based on a lack of information
or belief.
Regarding a certification that
evidentiary support for an allegation
in a complaint or a paragraph in an
answer will require IXUther discovery,
it is important to note just what the
1993 Federal Notes anticipated in this

regard. According to the 1993 Notes:
"[I]f evidentia1y support is not
obtained after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery,
the party has a duty under the rule
not to persist Zith that contention.
[The Bule] does not require a formal
amendment to pleadings for which
evidentiary support is not obtained, but
rather calls upon a litigant not thereafter to advocate such claims or defenses.
The certification is that there is (or
likely will be) 'evidentiary support'
for the allegation, not that the party
will prevail with respect to its contention UHJDUGLQJthe fact. ... Denials of
factualcontentions involve somewhat
different considerations. Often, of
course, a denial is premised upon
the existence of evidence contradicting the alleged IDFW At other times a
GHQLDOis permissible because, after an
appropriate investigation, a party has
no LQIRUPDWLRQconcerning the matter
or, indeed, KDV a reasonable basis for
doubting the credibility of the only evidence relevant to the matter. A party
should not deny an allegation it knows
to be true; but it is not required, simply
because it lacks contradictory evidence,
to admit an allegation that it believes is
not true."6

In the case of plaintiffs' attorneys,
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the "certification" referred to in the
above quote from the 1993 Advismy
Notes is to the requirement in Bule
802.05(2) that when allegations in
a complaint are specifically identified as lacking evidentiary support,
the plaintiffs' attorney must in effect
"certify" that such evidentiary support
will likely be established after a reasonable opportunity has been afforded
for further investigation or discoveJy.
In the case of defense attorneys, the
"certification" is to the requirement in
Rule 802.05(2)(d) that when denials
of fDctual contentions are specifically
identified as not warranted by the
facts, the defense attorney must in effect "certify" that they are nonetheless
"reasonably based on a lack of information and belief."

Importance of 1993 Federal
Advisory Committee Notes
It is important to emphasize that while
the majority in SCO 03-06 did reproduce the 1993 FedeUDOAdvisory Committee Notes to FRCP 11, it supplied
them "for information pXUposes only."
The SCO 03-06 majority nevertheless
emphaticDOO\signaled that the 1993
Advismy Committee Notes should be
given a good deal of respect:
"FRCP 11 has ... undergone substantial revision, most recently in 1993.
The court now adopts the current
version ofF5CP 11, pursuant [to] its
authority under s. 751.12 to regulate
pleading, practice and procedure in
judiciDOproceedings. The court's intent
is to simplify and harmonize the rules
of pleading, practice and procedure,
and to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits. In
adopting the 1993 amendments to
F5CP 11, the court does not intend to
deprive a party wronged by frivolous
conduct of a right to recovery; rather,
the court intends to provide Wisconsin
courts vvith additional tools to deal
with frivolous filing of pleadings and
other pDpers. Judges and practitioners
will now be able to look to applicable
decisions offederal courts since 1993
for guidance LQthe Interpretation and
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application of the mandates of FRCP
11 in Wisconsin."1
Because they have been reproduced as part of new Rule 802.05, the
1993 Federal Advisory Committee
otes bear careful study, despite their
inclusion for "information purposes
only." One of the points made in the
1993 Notes relates to the scope of the
subject matter covered by Wisconsin's
version of FRCP 11 in Rule 802.05:
"The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with
or submitted to the court. It does not
cover matters arising for the first time
during oral presentations to the court,
when counsel may make statements
that would not have been made if
there had been more time for study
and reflection. However, a litigant's
obligations with respect to the contents
of these papers are not measured solely
as of the time they are filed with or
submitted to the court, but include
reaffirming to the court and advocating
positions contained in those pleadings
and motions after learning that they
cease to have any meUit."
Most important, the 1993 Notes
make it c1ystal clear that the 1993
version of FRCP 11 was intended to
remove much of the incentive for satellite litigation, that is, ancillary litigation undertaken to punish an attorney
responsible for a frivolous filing for the
purpose of obtaining full compensation
for the harm done by frivolous conduct. Consider the following language
from the 1993 Notes in light of the
facts of the Jandrt decision:
"Under unusual circumstances ...
deterrence may be ineffective tmless
the sanction not only requires the
person violating the rule to make a
PRQHWDU\payment, but also directs
that some or all of this payment be
made to those injured by the violation .... Any such award to another
party, however, should not exceed
the H[SHQVHVand attorneys' fees for
the services directly and unavoidably
caused by the violation .. . The award
should not provide compensation far
seroices that could have been avoided
E\an earlier disclosure of evidence or

an earlier challenge to the groundless
claims or defenses. Moreover, partial
reimbursement of fees may constitute
a sufficient deterrent with respect to
violations by persons having modest financial resources." [Emphasis added.]
The Dissents to Order 03·06

Three justices dissented from the enby
of SCO 03-06. Justice Prosser wrote
a dissent in which he underscored his
objection to the action of the majority
in repealing section 814.025 on the
grounds that the supreme cowt had
thus "obliterated a validly enacted
statute" of the Wisconsin Legislature
and eliminated the substantive rights
of victims of frivolous conduct.
Justice Roggensack penned a
much longer dissent, in which Justices
Prosser and Wilcox joined, setting
forth in detail the reasons for her
belief that the majority was in error
when it entered SCO 03-06. Justice
Roggensack wrote: "I dissent for two
reasons. First, this court does not have
the power under either a statute or
the constitution to repeal § 814.025,
because it is a substantive law that was
duly created by acts of the legislature.
Second, while this court has the power
to revise § 802.05 in certain instances
because it began as a Supreme Court
rule, the revisions made by the majority are contrary to the interests of the
public.
In Justice Roggensack's view Rule
814.025 granted to victims of frivolous
lawsuits substantive relief, which could
not be disposed of by a supreme court
order. Justice Roggensack maintained
that to allow the supreme court to
repeal section 814.025 DPRXQWVto a
violation of the separation of powers under the Constitution. Justice
Roggensack also stated that new Rule
802.05 "does much to protect lawyers,
but it does so at the expense of protecting the public from the expenses
incurred in needless litigation."
Justice Roggensack acknowledged
the "valid concerns" about access to
justice raised by the dissent in Jandrt,
but argued that those concerns could

have been addressed without the
wholesale revision of Rule 802.05 or
the repeal of Rule 814.025.
Practical Problems: Should New
Rule 802.05 Apply Retroactively?

Practical challenges Zill arise from
attempting to enforce this rule in Wisconsin circuit cowts. The first issue is
whether new Rule 802.05 should apply
retroactively to cases that were pending when it became effective on July 1,
2005. Research strongly suggests that
it should apply retroactively.9
First, the supreme court did not
repeal either section 802.05 or section
814.025 and then replace them with
a rule located outside of the Code of
Civil Procedure. lew Rule 802.05 was
made part of the Code of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the recreation
is based on and clearly derived from
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As the SCO 03-06 majority
stated:
'The court now adopts the current
version of FRCP 11, pursuant to its
authRUity under s. 751.12 to regulate
pleading, practice and procedure in
judicial proceedings. The court's intent
is to simplify and harmonize the rules
of pleading, practice and procedure,
and to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits."10
ew Rule 802.05 is not a statute
enacted by the legislature. Therefore,
the rule's retroactivity is not subject
to the holdings in Ma,rtin v. Richards,
Neiman v. American National Property, or Matthies v. Positive Safety
Manufacturing, 11 all of which address
in some measure the issue of whether
the legislature intended a statute to
apply retroactively. It is interesting to
note, however, that even retroactive
legislation enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality. 12
ew Rule 802.05 was developed
by the supreme court following
lengthy public bearings and after
lengthy deliberations that spanned
two years. This new rule represents
a thoughtful analysis of FRCP 11, as
DPended in 1993, and is intended to
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eliminate perceived unfairaspects of
pre\ious sections 802.05 and .025.
The public and interested organizations \:vere permitted to submit materials, briefs, and arguments to the FRXUW
before the new rule was adopted. The
rule is clearly intended to streamline
and modernize proceedings concerning
frivolity and bring them into conformity
with procedures that now exist in the
federal arena pursuant to FRCP 11,
as amended in 1993. In the words of
the SCO 03-06 majority, "Judges and
practitioners will now be able to look to
applicable decisions of federal courts
since 1993 for guidance in the interpretation and application of the mandates
of FRCP 11 in Wisconsin."
Wisconsin cases do not appear
to have directly addressed the issue
of amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, has held that
"[a]mendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure should he given
retroactive application to the PD[LPXP
extent possible," 13 and a federal district
court held that "[i]n determining
whether the retrospective application of
[a] rule is 'just and practicable,' [courts
are] guided by the principle that to the
maximum extent possible ... arnencled
Buies should be given retroactive
application ...."
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed
the issue of amendments to rules of
civil procedure in LandgUDIY US, Film
Products and concluded:
"Changes in procedural rules
may often be applied in suits arising
before their enactment without raising
concerns about retroacti:vitv.... :H
noted the diminished relianceinterests
in matters of procedure ..337 U.S., at
71, 69 S. Ct., at 952-953. Because rules
of procedure regulate secondary rather
than SULPDU\conduct, the fact that a
new procedural rule was instituted after
the conduct giving rise to the suit does
not make application of the rule at WULDO
retroactive. Cf McBurney v. Carson, 99
U.S. 567, 569,25 L. Ed. 378 (1879) ....
While we have strictly construed the Ex
Post Facto Clause to prohibit application of new statutes creating or increas~

ing punishments after the fact, we have
upheld intervening procedural changes
even if application of the new rule
operated to a defendant's disadvantage
in the particular case." 16
As the Fourth Circuit noted in
Altizerv. Deeds, "[t]hc Supreme Court
has upheld procedural changes even
\vhere they Zork to the disadvantage
of defendants in pending cases. See . , .
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 ...
(1990): Bertzell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167,
46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (192.5)). 17
New Rule 802.0.5 did not arise from
a specific decision of the :isconsin
Supreme Court Zithin the context of a
pending case. However, with respect to
such decisions, the supreme court has
established that retroactive application of a procedural decision in a civil
action is ordinarily to be favoredAs the
court has noted, :isconsin generally
adheres to the doctrine that retroactive
application of judicial decisions is the
rule, not the exception."As the court
stated fXUther in Bradley, in the case of
civil procedure rules "retroactive application is presumeG."19
Even Zhen a procedurDl rule
results IUom the decision in a particular
case, the preferred course is to apply
the rule retroactively. In Harper v.
Virginia Department RITaxation, 20 the
U.S. Supreme Court held:
"When this Court applies a rule of
federal law to the parties before it, that
rule is the controlling LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
of federal law and must be given full
retroactive elTect in all cases still open
on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate
or postdate our announcement of the
rule." 2 t
Wisconsin appellate courts have
taken a similar approach to new procedural rules developed in the course
of litigation. Our courts refer to the
concept of "sunbursting," which is a
terrn used for prospective application
of a rule developed within the common
law as well as changes in the way that
courts interpret statutes. According to
In re ThieO:22 "[L]imiting a ne\v rule to
prospecbve application only or 'sunbursting' is appropriate only if there is
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a compellh1g judicial reason to limit its
application to future litigants."23

Appropriate Sanctions Under New
Rule 802.05
As noted in SCO 03-06, "Judges and
practitioners will now be able to look to
applicable decisions of federal courts
since 1993 for guidance in the interpretation and application of the mandates
of FRCP 11 in Wisconsin." Since the
amendment of FRCP 11 in 1993, courts
have repeatedly stated that the basic
principle under F5CP 11 is that the
least severe sanction adequate to deter
misconduct is the one that should he
imposed. According to the court in White
v. Camden City Boardof(GXFDWLRQ:24
"Any sanction imposed under Rule 11
'should be calibrated to the least severe
level necessary to serve the deterrent
purpose of the Hule,' =XN u. Eastern
Fa. Psychiatric lnst. RIWKH MeG College
of Fa., 103 F..3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citing 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 136 (2d eel. Supp. 1996)), and may
include monetary sanctions, reprimands,
orders to undergo continuing legal
education, and referrals to disciplinDUy
authorities, see Zuk, 103 F.3d at 301."25
In Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania
Psychiatric Institute, the court stated
that: "[t]he 1993 revision ... makes clear
that the main purpose of 5ule l.l. is to
deter, not to compensate. Accordingly,
it changes the emphasis in the types of
sanctions to be ordered. It envisions as
the norm public interest remedies such
as fines and reprimands, as opposed to
the prior emphasis on private interest
remedies. Thus, the AdYLVRU\Committee
Notes state that any monetDUy penalty
'should ordinmily be paid into the court'
except 'under unusual circumstances'.
Any sanction imposed should be calibrated to the least severe level necessary to serve the deterrent pmpose of
the Rule. In addition, the new Rule 11
contemplates greater use of QRQPRQHWDU\
sanctions, including reprimands, orders
to undergo continuing education, and
referrals to disciplinmy authorities.""
According to Leuallen v. Borough of
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Paulsboro: "Thus, an 'appropriate' sanction may be 'a warm-friendly discussion
on the record, a hard-nosed repiimand in open court, compulsory legal
education, monetary sanctions, or other
measures appropriate to circumstances.'
The sanction must be the least severe
sanction adequate to meet the purpose
of the sanctions and must be tailored to
the particular facts of each case.'>27
In a similar vein, the court in Augustine v. Adams stated: "'[T]he primary
purpose of sanctions is to deter attorney
and litigant misconduct, not to compensate the opposing party for its costs in
defending a frivolous suit.' White, 908
F.2d at 684. The amount of sanctions
must be the minimum amount necessary to deter future violations."28 It is
true that courts must take an offending
party's ability to pay into consideration
in imposing FRCP 11 sanctions, but not
in the same way a court or jury would
do when assessing punitive damages.
According to Kassab v. Aetna
Industries:
"The principal goal of Rule 11 sanctions is deterrence, with compensation
to the SDUW\forced to litigate an impropHUO\filed claim being a secondary aim.
Orlett v. Cincinnati Microwave, Inc.,
954 F.2d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 1992); see
also Danvers v. Danvers, 959 F.2d 601,
605 (6th Cir. 1992). A claim for a party's
total costs requires an investigation
into the reasonableness of those costs.
RUOHWW954 F.2d at 419; see DOVRBodenhamer, 989 F.2d at 217 ('the amount of
the sanction must be reasonable'); Danvers, 959 F.2d at 605 ('because deterrence is the primary goal, the minimum
necessary to deter the sanctioned party
is the proper award, even if this DPRXQW
does not fully compensate the moving
SDUW\ (emphasis in original). Before
awarding a party's total costs and fees
as sanctions, the district court should
consider the offending party's ability to
pay, want of diligence, and the amount
necessary and effective to bring about
deterrence. "29
It is very in1portant to emphasize
that "compensable fees under Rule 11
should be limited to those incurred
DVa result of the offensive pleading; a

blanket award of all fees incurred during litigation is not authorized under
Rule 11."30 Courts have emphasized
that under FRCP 11, as amended in
1993, the imposition of sanctions is
very much a function of educating the
bar. In Shepherdson v. Nigro, the court
admonished counsel to exercise more
care in future cases.31

Courts should very carefully
scrutinize claims for attorney fees
under FRCP 11 to determine whether
the fee requests are reasonable and
whether the fees were incurred as
a result of the allegedly frivolous
conduct. In Elsman v. Standard Fed.
Bank, the court stated:
"A claim for a party's total costs
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requires an investigation into the
reasonableness of those costs. Orlett v.
Cincinnati Microwave, Inc., 954 F.2d
414 (6th Cir. 1992). Before awarding a
party's total costs and fees as sanctions,
the district court should consider the
offending party's ability to pay, want of
diligence, and the amount necessmy
and effective to bring about deterrence. Id. Compensable fees under
5ule 11 should be limited to those
incurred as a result of the offensive
pleading. See Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp.
v. Architecturalllesearch CRUp., 989
F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1993). Further,
when granting Rule 11 attorney fees
on remand, the district court must review such costs with exacting scrutiny;
a blanket award of all fees incXUred
dXUing litigation is not authorized
under 5ule 11. "32
+RZever, as the EOsman court
makes clear, while courts should
carefully and strictly review an award

of actual and reasonable attorney fees,
such an award is not precluded in an
appropriate case.
Dismissal is a legitimate FRCP 11
sanction''4 and in and of itself is a vety
strong and severe sanction. 3·5

Conclusion
The 1993 Federal Advisory Committee Notes make it very dear that the
touchstone of new Rule 802.05 should
be equity and the SURSRUWLRQDOLW\of
response to an allegedly frivolous act.
This is a refreshing development in the
jurisprudence of Wisconsin, and one
that can and should lead to an increase
in civility in our litigational process. :e
hope that :isconsin practitioners DQG
judges take the time to study both the
text of new 5XOH802.0.5 and the 199:3
Federal Advisorv Committee Notes.
Those Notes providerich insight into
the spirit of F5CP 11, as amended in
199.3. Moreover; counsel will discover
that the case law that has come GRZQ
under F5CP ll, as amended in 1993,
serves to underscore the 1993 Notes.
Although the 1993 Federal Advismy Notes have been reproduced
IROORZLQJ new Rule 802.05 only for
information pnrposes, it is well to
remember that the SCO 0:3-06 court
majority stated: "Judges and practitioners will now be able to look to
applicable decisions of federal courts
since 1993 for guidance in the interpretation and application of the mandates
ofFRCP 11 in Wisconsin." Fnlljudicial
discretion, equity, and fair play have
now been returned to frivolous sanction
practice in :isconsin, and this development can only serve the best interests
of the Judiciaty, the bar, and the general
public.
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